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Potential Aboriginal Rights-holders: Canada and Cultural Communities versus 
Indigenous Peoples and Socio-political Bodies 
Abstract 
When an Aboriginal right is asserted, questions arise about the nature of the “proper” rights-holder. 
Canadian jurisprudence has understood Aboriginal claims as culturally grounded (R v Van der Peet). This 
article tracks how this plays out, looking not just at rights-claims that directly fit the “integral to the 
distinct culture” test, but also at claims that might be possible should the Supreme Court allow for rights 
that need not be tied to specific “customs, practices and traditions” following its treatment of Aboriginal 
title (R v Delgamuukw). Next, this article focuses on Indigenous self-determination. This interpretive lens 
raises questions about why jurisprudence has been built the way it has, exploring an underlying principled 
approach (which treats Aboriginal rights as claims of groups accorded weight within the multicultural 
setting of modern liberal democracy). This analysis highlights why current jurisprudential approaches 
leave no room for robust forms of Indigenous self-determination. The endgame is predetermined; namely, 
the authority of Indigenous collectives is severely diminished. If identifying who proper rights-holders are 
is left to Canadian courts, we fail to engage with fundamentally important matters of Indigenous self-
determination. 




Potential Aboriginal Rights-holders: 
Canada and Cultural Communities 
versus Indigenous Peoples and 
Socio-political Bodies 
GORDON CHRISTIE* 
When an Aboriginal right is asserted, questions arise about the nature of the “proper” rights-
holder. Canadian jurisprudence has understood Aboriginal claims as culturally grounded 
(R v Van der Peet). This article tracks how this plays out, looking not just at rights-claims that 
directly fit the “integral to the distinct culture” test, but also at claims that might be possible 
should the Supreme Court allow for rights that need not be tied to specific “customs, practices 
and traditions” following its treatment of Aboriginal title (R v Delgamuukw). Next, this article 
focuses on Indigenous self-determination. This interpretive lens raises questions about why 
jurisprudence has been built the way it has, exploring an underlying principled approach 
(which treats Aboriginal rights as claims of groups accorded weight within the multicultural 
setting of modern liberal democracy). This analysis highlights why current jurisprudential 
approaches leave no room for robust forms of Indigenous self-determination. The endgame 
is predetermined; namely, the authority of Indigenous collectives is severely diminished. If 
identifying who proper rights-holders are is left to Canadian courts, we fail to engage with 
fundamentally important matters of Indigenous self-determination. 
* Professor and Director, Indigenous Legal Studies, Peter Allard School of Law, the University 
of British Columbia. 













I. SITUATIONS IN WHICH IDENTIFICATION OF THE RIGHTS-HOLDER MAY BE AN ISSUE .................... 6 
II. PRECEDENT........................................................................................................................................ 10 
III. WHO COULD BE THE PROPER RIGHTS-HOLDERS? .......................................................................... 12 
IV. WORKING WITH POSSIBLE RIGHT-CLAIMS WITHIN THE VAN DER PEET FRAMEWORK.................. 14 
V. WORKING WITH BROADER FORMS OF SECTION 35 RIGHTS ............................................................ 21 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S PRINCIPLED APPROACH ...................................................... 27 
VII. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 35 
DETERMINING WHO THE PROPER rights-holder is has increasingly emerged as a 
serious issue in disputes centred on Aboriginal rights and title. One development 
driving this discussion has been the shift in focus to matters of duties to consult 
and accommodate. Post-Haida Nation, the Crown has acknowledged that when it 
contemplates authorizing activity that may adversely afect Aboriginal rights and 
title, even when these rights are merely asserted, it will often be legally required 
to engage with those potentially afected.1 Consequently, there has been a rise 
of such instruments as impact beneft agreements, means by which third-party 
proponents of projects impacting Aboriginal lands and waters can achieve their 
desired degree of certainty.2 Who, though, are the proper Aboriginal rights 
and title-holders? Who should be consulted when the Crown contemplates 
authorizing activity on lands and waters over which Aboriginal rights and title can 
be asserted? Who can enter into negotiations around side agreements concerning 
projects that will seriously impact Aboriginal lands and waters? 
Tis article looks at a matter that underlies these developments and the 
questions that swirl around them. Questions can arise as to which Aboriginal 
collective or representative should be approached, as often there are, quite simply, 
many diverse collectives that may be approached. Consider, for example, Crown– 
1. Tis all emerged from a trilogy of cases from the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004-2005. 
See Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73; Taku River Tlingit 
First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74; Mikisew Cree 
First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69. 
2. As companies seek authorization for their projects from the Crown, they can avoid getting 
caught up in long, complex, and opaque consultation processes by reaching mutually 
benefcial side-agreements with potentially afected Aboriginal communities. 
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industry–Indian3 negotiations involving proposed resource development on 
lands over which rights may exist, rights that may include title. In almost all such 
situations, the Crown approaches local First Nations, where these are typically 
small communities living on reserves, which are governed under a band council 
system. Increasingly, challenges to these bodies are being launched from multiple 
directions. For example, members of these communities may argue their band 
councils: (a) do not speak for them as their legitimate governments (or legitimate 
representatives); and (b) have no authority outside that mandated in the Indian 
Act4 (that is, beyond the limited powers delegated through the Indian Act, powers 
which are all limited to reserve lands). In these and other sorts of situations, other 
Indigenous bodies are being presented as legitimate rights and title-holders.5 
To keep this discussion manageable, I focus on claims to site-specifc 
Aboriginal rights.6 Tese sorts of claims underlay many recent developments we 
witness, as they are most often claims to rights that connect to lands beyond 
the geographic boundaries of any particular reserve. If we think again of merely 
asserted rights, the degree to which the Crown is obligated to consult depends on 
the potential impact of the proposed activity on these rights (should they exist) 
and strength of claim, the ability of the Aboriginal community asserting the rights 
3. See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(24), reprinted in RSC 1985, 
Appendix II, No 5. Tis section holds that exclusive federal jurisdiction applies to “Indians 
and lands reserved for Indians.” See also Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(2), being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]. Tis states that “In this Act, 
‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.” In 
the rest of this article, I use the term “Aboriginal,” but I am referring specifcally to Indians as 
this term is used in section 35. 
4. RSC 1985, c I-5. 
5. See e.g. Wesley v Canada, 2017 FC 725 at para 4. Justice Barnes notes: 
Yahaan [Donald Wesley, applicant for judicial review of processes tied to approval of the Pacifc 
Northwest LNG project in northwestern British Columbia] purports to be the Head Chief or 
sm’oogit of the Gitwilgyoots. Gitwilgyoots is one of nine tribes that together constitute the 
Coast Tsimshian Nation. In his capacity as sm’oogit, Yahaan claims to be authorized to act on 
behalf of all members of the tribe for the purpose of asserting their unique and collective rights 
to consultation and accommodation. According to Yahaan, he succeeded to the position of 
sm’oogit upon the death of his maternal uncle, Harold Dudoward, in 2007. Tis status was 
confrmed by custom during a community feast held at Lax Kw’Alaams in 2008. 
6. While assertions of Aboriginal title are increasingly commonplace, underscoring duties to 
consult and accommodate, there are still in Canada very few cases dealing specifcally with 
Aboriginal title. Further, much of what is said here about who the rights-holders might 
be for site-specifc Aboriginal rights-claims applies closely to what could be said about 
Aboriginal title claims. 




to build a case that they are rights that ought to be seriously considered. Just over 
the reserve boundary of any particular First Nation it is not clear, however, that 
the band council for this community has any particular say in relation to these 
claimed rights. 
Tis focus on site-specifc Aboriginal rights claims is channeled through a 
second very specifc lens. Indeed, this second analytical lens is what ultimately 
directs the investigation in this work. Too quickly, questions about proper 
rights-holders seem to fnd their place within Canadian courts, subject to the 
reasoning of a non-Indigenous institution, one that makes up a component 
of the triad of the modern state, while the fundamental matter concerns how 
independent Indigenous communities assert their identities in the face of Crown 
activities. Trying to make sense of this matter within Canadian courts—where 
arguably Indigenous self-determination will be left to one side—is extremely 
problematic, not simply because of the threat of narrow-minded reasoning, but 
because it may contribute to the diminishment of Indigenous self-determination 
in relation to fundamentally important matters. Tis article explores how 
questions about who might properly hold site-specifc rights might be addressed 
within Canadian law, should Indigenous self-determination be taken seriously. 
My primary objective in this article is to show how Canadian courts approach 
questions about proper rights-holders, and how they are likely to build on their 
current approach should they be directly faced with these matters. Te outcome 
of this examination is the realization that not only is it very likely there will be 
little room for notions of Indigenous self-determination to play a role in the 
deliberations of Canadian courts, but it is also arguable that how the Supreme 
Court has built jurisprudence seems designed to prevent the authority of 
Indigenous peoples from playing a role in resolving these matters. Not only will 
Indigenous peoples not be able to assert that bodies they constitute hold rights 
and responsibilities in Canada in relation to their lands and waters, but Canadian 
courts will almost certainly answer questions about proper rights-holders by 
considering only those rights the courts will imagine and countenance— 
specifcally, those limited to essentially cultural matters. 
In this article, I consider how Canadian courts are likely to approach 
questions about proper rights-holders in a series of stages. First, I look into the 
matter of precedent, asking how much we can divine about how the Supreme 
Court of Canada will approach such questions should they principally make use 
of existing case law. Tis frst stage is itself broken down into two parts, as I frst 
explore how these questions will likely be approached within the Van der Peet
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framework,7 and then consider how the Supreme Court might push past this 
framework (using Delgamuukw as a guide).8 
Finding there are gaps in the jurisprudence and novel issues to address, I turn 
in the second stage of analysis to what animates existing case law. We witness 
from Sparrow onward a certain form of understanding the Court has applied 
to the recognition and afrmation of the existing Aboriginal (and treaty) rights 
of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada,9 a form of understanding that functions 
to both generate a sense of the nature of the problems Canadian courts must 
grapple with and then what the solutions might be.10 
Te stage is illuminating, as we see there are currently two strong forces 
at play, one within the reasoning of the high Court, the other dancing around 
its edges. On the one hand, we can see how the Court has been crafting a 
particular approach grounded in a liberal democratic sense of how diferent 
cultural groups can make claims to have their ways of living protected from state 
interference. Te fact that this approach is predominant explains much of what 
we see and can expect to see within the jurisprudence of Canadian courts vis-à-vis 
Aboriginal claims.11 On the other hand, we can see that one thing the Court 
is aware of, but cannot accommodate in any serious manner within a liberal 
democratic framework, is the push for self-determination by Indigenous peoples. 
One suggestion that emerges from this article’s analysis is that it is arguable the 
Supreme Court hopes to defuse the radical nature of this push by taming what 
it may within Canadian law and policy. Dictating certain responses to who the 
proper rights-holders might be could go a long way to achieving this end. 
At the end of all this, we are left with Indigenous self-determination, 
a matter whose serious content is seemingly neutralized in the case law by how 
the Court has built up decades of jurisprudence. Should one try to advance 
serious arguments within the framework of the Canadian system that the power 
of Indigenous self-determination should determine who proper rights-holders 
7. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507. 
8. Delgamuukw v British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 1010. 
9. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 3, s 35(1). Tis section states that “Te existing [A] 
boriginal and treaty rights of the [A]boriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized 
and afrmed.” See also R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow]. Tis was the frst 
case from the Supreme Court of Canada to explore the meaning and implications of this 
constitutional provision. 
10. Where the nature of the solutions depends fundamentally on how the Court has determined 
what the problems are. 
11. For an extended discussion, see Gordon Christie, Canadian Law and Indigenous 
Self-Determination (University of Toronto Press, 2019) chs 6-8. 







might be, outcomes to be expected are predetermined and too narrow to be 
satisfactory. It is, if you will, a rigged game. Te analysis in this article ends, 
then, with some discussion about where to go with all this. Is there some process 
that promises something other than the continued dissolution of Indigenous 
self-determination? Are there mechanisms or instruments that might be developed 
that move us away from the seemingly endless varieties of rigged games on tap? 
I. SITUATIONS IN WHICH IDENTIFICATION OF THE RIGHTS-
HOLDER MAY BE AN ISSUE 
While a wide range of possible situations arise in which questions can be 
raised about who holds and who can exercise rights recognized under section 
35, I restrict my discussion to a single specifc, though broad, sort of situation 
wherein Canadian courts may be called upon to determine which Aboriginal 
“community” holds rights that are defned by and protected within a specifc area. 
Before we begin, note I place “community” within scare-quotes to highlight 
my intent not to prejudge the nature of the collectives under discussion. Tese 
might be First Nations living entirely within the Indian Act, First Nations 
operating under the Indian Act but engaged in generations-long struggles 
to maintain a substantial measure of independence, larger collections of First 
Nations (sometimes grouped in visible associations such as Tribal Councils or the 
like, but sometimes amalgamated in ways less visible to the outside gaze), or those 
collectives—or components of those collectives—that understand themselves to 
be, and have been for a very long time, Indigenous nations (where nationhood 
itself is something the specifc Indigenous collective gives meaning to).12 
Our focus in the upcoming discussions falls heavily on the last kind of 
community, as when we engage with this entity, we enter into problems about 
proper rights-holders that cast the approach of the Canadian system into 
question. A people who retain a signifcant sense of themselves as constituting a 
nation or polity that emerges out of the original socio-political body inhabiting 
an area (before the arrival of and interference by colonial bodies) will have its own 
understandings of rights and responsibilities, its own understandings of how it 
organizes itself internally and in relation to others, and its own understandings of 
12. With all Inuit now living within one or another modern treaty their matters of identity 
for the purposes of rights under section 35 are not subject to the problems we address in 
this article. Te Métis, on the other hand, bring into this picture their own set of concerns, 
but on the most general level—asking about how the Supreme Court will bring in 
community-scale—the situations in which they might be wrapped up in are similar. 
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who might be proper decision-makers when it comes to deciding how lands and 
waters are approached by humans. 
Tis is the complex landscape where questions about proper rights-holders 
fall. We narrow focus to when a site-specifc Aboriginal right is at issue.13 Te 
general framework for establishing an Aboriginal right was set out in R v Van 
der Peet.14 An Aboriginal community must show that at contact with Europeans, 
a practice, custom, or tradition being used today was integral to the distinctive 
culture of that people at that time (the integral to the distinctive culture test). 
An Aboriginal community claiming, for example, a right to hunt in a territory, 
a site-specifc Aboriginal right, would need to establish that, at contact with 
Europeans, hunting in that area was an integral aspect of their distinctive culture. 
A site-specifc rights-claim, then, is one in which a right to be established under 
the Van der Peet test is expected to be defned such that it is connected to a 
specifc location or area, where a Canadian court may be called upon to probe the 
nature of the Aboriginal community that would hold this right. 
In R v Bernard, Mr. Bernard, a member of the larger Mi’kmaq nation, had 
been charged with hunting within Mi’kmaq territory, albeit in an area at some 
remove from the specifc Mi’kmaq community from which he had family roots. 
Te Court of Appeal of New Brunswick held that the common law in Canada 
already determines that with site-specifc Aboriginal rights there is a requirement 
of community continuity.15 Tat is, if an Aboriginal community present at contact 
with Europeans satisfed the Van der Peet test for an Aboriginal right, a modern 
community must enjoy a measure of continuity with the historic community in 
order to assert the right at that site. 
13. A second situation where the question of proper rights-holders can arise is when Aboriginal 
title is at issue. With Aboriginal title claims, the aim is to establish that at the time of 
the assertion of Crown sovereignty, an area was occupied in such a manner as to show 
exclusivity and “sufcient” occupation (defned as regular use). See Tsilhqot’in Nation v 
British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in]. In such circumstances a Canadian court may 
be called upon to inquire into the nature of the Aboriginal community that exclusively and 
sufciently occupied the lands in question, particularly when there may be suspicion that the 
community making the claim is not the same as the historical community. Interestingly, the 
only two cases directly addressing title that reached the Court (Delgamuukw, supra note 8 
and Tsilhqot’in) were by original and reconstituted traditional Indigenous polities. Arguably, 
this is how it should be, given that within Canadian law, non-reserve lands are not under the 
jurisdiction, and are in no way the property of, band councils (whose authority is mandated 
to extend only to reserve lands). 
14. Supra note 7. 
15. 2017 NBCA 48 [Bernard]. 
(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
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Tere are two troubling scenarios suggested by this hypothetical. First, it may 
be that Aboriginal communities in the area in which this location exists have 
shifted geographically since contact with Europeans, such that an Aboriginal 
community now inhabits and practices traditional activities in this location 
while a socio-culturally distinct Aboriginal community did so at contact. Second, 
it may be that there are varied registers of community, such that one could say a 
large-scale Aboriginal community inhabited at contact the larger area surrounding 
and including the specifc site at issue in this case, while subunits within this 
larger community have moved around within this area over time. One might then 
fnd that something like the frst scenario holds, where a subunit now practices 
traditional activities at the specifc location at issue where historically a diferent 
subunit practiced such activities there, and where both subunits are components 
of the larger socio-cultural community). Both scenarios are troubling, but the 
second brings us closer to the problems on which I wish to focus.16 
One might say the basic question before us appears to be about nothing 
but community-scale, and how this can afect whether a proper rights-holder 
is in place to make a claim. Clearly, there is already in Canadian law a 
community-continuity requirement, if by this is meant that at some specifc 
location should a member of an Aboriginal community engage in an activity that 
this person’s community hopes to argue is protected, this community would need 
to be the community that traditionally had this activity be an aspect of a custom, 
practice or tradition integral to its distinctive culture at this location. Te only 
real challenge that seems to arise concerns whether the community identifed here 
must be (or should be) a local community (that is, a people intimately tied to this 
specifc area, both historically and contemporarily), or whether the holder of the 
right in question could be (or should be) that larger socio-cultural community (of 
which any local community has been traditionally a part). 
Problems that actually arise, however, are about much more than just 
community-scale. Consider common contemporary situations, in which we 
usually fnd a First Nation assumed to be the Aboriginal rights-holder for the area 
immediately around that community, where such a local community is in fact 
16. Tis is not to dismiss problems associated with the frst—it also speaks to a range of 
troubling assumptions and principles at play in how Aboriginal rights are developed and 
function in contemporary Canada—however, time and space restrictions mean that this 
cannot be the place to engage with issues that arise due to the displacement of peoples 
through settler-colonial pressures. Most obvious, of course, is the fact that events propelled 
by the often-uncontrolled nature of settler expansion account for much of the displacement 
of peoples, with, for example, a steady westward push through the nineteenth century and 
early in the twentieth century. 
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the product of a generations-long process of attempted political dismemberment 
carried out by the federal government (part of an overall historical process on 
the part of the colonial state of cutting up and replacing larger socio-politically 
defned peoples). It may be, however, that within this contemporary body there 
are (sometimes cutting across a number of these units) more traditional entities, 
such as family-groups, clans, houses, et cetera, that could arguably be the bodies 
with legitimate claims to access and control resources made available through 
activities identifed as Aboriginal rights.17 Tis is just one way to complicate 
the narrative, and thinking it through opens the door wide to the larger set of 
issues that site-specifc Aboriginal rights invites. When we addressed the way the 
Supreme Court has framed the matter, we discussed socio-cultural bodies, and 
yet when we think of attempts at dismembering larger pre-existing Indigenous 
polities, and the weakening the sub-units within such bodies may have endured, 
we cannot help but turn to matters of politics and of self-determination. 
Tis is ultimately where attention must be drawn, as we come to see that 
deeper challenges have to do with the meeting of two diferent ways of thinking 
about the nature of Indigenous communities. Te superfcial manner introduced 
frst sees the only relevant distinction being between a larger socio-cultural 
community and smaller subunits that historically would have comprised the 
larger body. Canadian law seems to frame any sort of situation like this as one in 
which a larger, and fairly amorphous, socio-cultural body, over the generations, 
has been divided into what we see today—First Nations, those small communities 
that are relatively fxed to local areas. Te second possibility, however, is of larger 
socio-cultural-political bodies, comprised of all diferent kinds of possible smaller 
components —families, extended families, houses, clans, nations—where the 
larger socio-political body is most often ignored by the state, while these smaller 
17. See Delgamuukw, supra note 8; Tsilhqot’in, supra note 13. Tese are British Columbia cases 
regarding claims to Aboriginal title that reached the Supreme Court of Canada. In both, 
the claimants were the original larger socio-cultural-political bodies, the nations from which 
First Nation bands had been carved by federal and provincial authorities over time. However, 
claims for title at present seem to be advanced by subunits, which appear to be segments of 
original larger socio-cultural-political bodies to which they were traditionally connected. 
Te issue of community-scale can arise, as Canadian courts are likely to be called upon to 
determine which scale of community can hold title to an area. For example, on the northwest 
coast of Vancouver Island, the Nuchatlaht First Nation which is historically a component 
of the larger Nuu-chah-nult, has advanced a claim in spring of 2017 being provided with 
dates for trial. See e.g. Chad Pawson, “Vancouver Island’s Nuchatlaht following Tsilhqot’in 
in Land, Title Claim,” CBC News (20 January 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ 
british-columbia/nuchatlaht-fles-aboriginal-land-title-case-bc-supreme-court-1.3945593> 
[perma.cc/7FNW-8Q3K]. 









components fnd themselves buried under the imposition of the band council/ 
reserve system. 
When discussion opens up to this larger dimension, when we put into play 
Indigenous collectives as polities, a new range of questions arise. What kinds of 
rights could the larger socio-political body claim within Canadian law? Would 
the exercise of these rights impact the ability of subcommunities to exercise their 
Aboriginal rights?18 Could the larger body, for example, hold rights to regulate 
activities in its traditional territory? Would such a right be limited to regulating 
the activity of the members of this group? Why would it not be that such a 
collective, having authority in relation to its territory, could exercise this authority 
over all activity taking place over the entirety of its lands and waters? 
We begin, however, with these questions momentarily set aside. Our frst 
task is to determine as best we can, with consideration to precedent, where 
the Supreme Court of Canada might go in addressing the sorts of questions 
to which current jurisprudence gives rise. As we progress through this analysis, 
we gradually introduce considerations that move us further and further toward 
having to bring in these other larger matters, as we ask whether we anticipate the 
Court will be able to fnd that original (or reconstituted) Indigenous polities are 
the rights-holders in relation to site-specifc rights. Tis sort of question opens the 
door to deeper issues, as we can then wonder how Canadian law might respond 
to robust Indigenous legal and political authority, making claims to determine 
how activities take place on Indigenous territories. 
II. PRECEDENT 
Before we jump into this analysis, we need to ensure we keep frmly in mind 
that our focus in this stage is on how Canadian law is likely to deal with matters. 
Much of this analysis is dependent on how legal instruments, and the conceptual 
18. Tere are disputes that pit band council systems against traditional governance structures, 
though they have only recently appeared in common law. See e.g. Wesley, supra note 5; 
Gitwangak Indian Band v Davis, 2017 BCSC 744 [Gitwangak]; Spookw v Gitxsan Treaty 
Society, 2017 BCCA 16 [Spookw]. In Gitwangak, we fnd an Eviction Order, which 
“purports to speak for the Gitwangak Hereditary Chiefs, Gitwangak Huwlip members, 
Gitwangak Band members and Gitwangak community members” issued to the band 
council of the community, the core dispute arising around the dissolution of a funding 
agreement for the Gitwangak Education Society. Other disputes involve complex layers of 
community-fracturing. For example, in Spookw, we fnd hereditary chiefs aligned with some 
band council leadership in opposition to the continuing work of the Gitxsan treaty society, 
a body facilitating treaty negotiations for the Gitxsan First Nation but sufering an apparent 
loss of legitimacy in the eyes of many individuals and groups within the community. 
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structures within which they are embedded, have been created and structured in 
this domestic legal regime. Besides the presumption Canadian law makes that 
the issues are only and entirely about socio-cultural bodies, we also fnd discourse 
narrowed to the language of rights, where the nature of these sorts of instruments 
in the Crown–Aboriginal context has been set out in a string of cases beginning 
in the early 1990s. As the discussion unfolds, we will see, this choice of how to 
deal with matters refects a specifc understanding of the sorts of problems that 
must be dealt with. Tat is, from the perspective of Canadian law, even certain 
ways of thinking of what the problems might be—in particular those that refect 
Indigenous perspectives—are simply not there to begin with. 
But now, on to precedent in Canadian jurisprudence. It helps to begin by 
outlining the kinds of questions wrapped up in the set of possible situations 
that might arise. One way to do so is by separating questions that focus more 
directly on who the rights-holder might be, from questions about the nature of 
the activity being explored (which brings in questions about how to characterize 
the right), to questions about the specifcation of the kind of right that might be 
at issue. We will see it is difcult, if not impossible, to address these diferent sorts 
of questions in the relatively isolated form in which I set them out. Tat said, 
pulling things apart in this way helps us dig more deeply into how precedent may 
function in approaching scenarios in which a site-specifc right is claimed. 
Te frst kind of question poses matters in the way we have already touched 
upon: for a site-specifc claim, is it a requirement that a local community be the 
rights-holder? If not, we could then ask whether precedent sets out factors a 
court should consider in deciding between a local community and a larger body, 
if a choice presents itself as to whether a local or larger-scale community should 
be seen to be the rights-holder. 
Te second kind of question is concerned with the ways rights-claims 
concerning site-specifc matters may be characterized. Here we imagine the Van 
der Peet framework requires all rights-claims be of one kind (namely, a claim must 
concern practices, customs and traditions argued to be integral to the distinctive 
culture of the people making the claim). One can imagine multiple sorts of 
rights-claims fulflling that requirement circling around the sort of situation we 
are investigating. For example, while a right to hunt in the specifc area could be 
claimed, so could (potentially at least) a claim be made by the larger Aboriginal 
community that it enjoys an Aboriginal right to regulate hunting, either amongst 
its constituent subunits or more generally on its territory (including, then, 
hunting by the local Aboriginal community in the specifc site in question). 
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Finally, the third sort of question looks to possible forms of rights that could 
be claimed. Here we imagine the Van der Peet framework could be broadened 
and ask about rights that could be found under section 35 that do not necessarily 
have to squeeze themselves into the integral to the distinctive culture mould.19 
III. WHO COULD BE THE PROPER RIGHTS-HOLDERS? 
We begin with the set of questions focused directly on who the rights-holder 
might be, asking whether a local or a larger-scale community should be seen to 
be the rights-holder, or whether there is an approach to resolving this matter that 
should be adopted.20 Leaving aside questions that normally intrude at this point— 
about, for example, what it means for an activity to be integral or distinctive, and 
whether the activity in question meets these amorphous requirements—we focus 
on the matter of the community or people claiming the right in question. 
Leaving aside the fact that almost all cases have been brought by First Nations, 
can we fnd precedent emerging from existing cases that might help settle the 
question as to whether, with respect to site-specifc claims, the local community 
should be seen to be the rights-holder (or precedent that more generally sets out 
rules about how to approach the question)? Besides the fact that the majority of 
cases have proceeded on the presumption that the local, reserve-based Aboriginal 
community is rightfully the properly-placed claimant, in Bernard the Court of 
Appeal of New Brunswick considered how remarks of the Court in Powley—in 
the context of Métis claims—should be seen to apply to First Nation-centered 
site-specifc claims.21 Noting that Powley was decided on the basis that it was 
necessary that the Métis establish (a) the presence of a historic community in 
19. A more general question is about whether some principled approach needs to be developed 
such that courts can work out in any given situation which sort of right should be the focus 
of their analysis and adjudication (though here we also have to begin to think about how the 
Court might construct an alternate test for diferent sorts of section 35 rights). 
20. If we put this in terms of whether a claimed-right is best conceptualized as holding over a 
narrowly defned area or over a larger expanse of lands (and possibly waters) we simply arrive 
back at the same sort of place in our analysis. Again, if the concern is simply that site-specifc 
rights be linked to specifc areas (and here we are dealing with a tautological matter!) there 
is no real dispute. But the question, with this language as our focus, would be about the 
extent of the area that serves as the site. Are all site-specifc Aboriginal rights limited to local 
areas, or can some such rights be exercised over larger expanses of the territory of a larger 
socio-cultural community? Or, is there need for some set of rules that can be applied to 
specifc disputes, when it might seem to be possible to say a claim could be applied to either 
a localized area or a larger expanse of territory? 
21. Bernard, supra note 15. 
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the area where the hunting took place, and (b) that the present community be 
reasonably contiguous with that community, the court in Bernard went on to say: 
Tere would seem to be no rational basis for the claim the Métis peoples only get to 
exercise aboriginal rights that are grounded in the existence of a historic and present 
community, whereas other aboriginal peoples get to exercise the right regardless of 
whether it is so grounded. If that is to be the law, that is for the Supreme Court to 
determine. At present, Powley establishes that Aboriginal rights, as communal rights, 
may only be exercised by virtue of an individual’s ancestrally based membership in a 
present community that is linked to the historic community.22 
Te key expression to focus upon is  linked to. Mr. Bernard is a member 
of the Sipekne’katik First Nation, one First Nation within the larger Mi’kmaq 
community. Tere is no question that the local community in the area where 
the hunting took place is linked to the larger Mi’kmaq nation. As well, there is 
no question that the Sipekne’katik is linked to the historic (larger) community. 
Tis particular Mi’kmaq First Nation, however, is not geographically close to 
the area where Mr. Bernard was hunting. Te trial judge found that whatever 
(other) local Mi’kmaq community had existed in the area where Mr. Bernard had 
been hunting, there was no evidence that that community was still a presence in 
the area, and it was clear Mr. Bernard was not a member of whatever Mi’kmaq 
community that might have been. 
What we encounter in this reasoning, however, is an analogy that does not 
seem particularly strong, one that (as the NBCA presciently acknowledges) the 
Supreme Court of Canada will at some point have to address. Is the parallel between 
the larger Métis people and local Métis communities the same as what we might 
expect between the larger Mi’kmaq nation and local Mi’kmaq communities? 
Why, alternatively, would the analogy not track the structure of section 35, being 
then between (a) the larger Métis people and local Métis communities, and (b) 
the larger body of Indians and local Indigenous communities (i.e., the Mi’kmaq)? 
A reasonable suspicion is that the Court was concerned not with the presence 
or absence of links per se, but of organizational links, of something more political 
than cultural. As much as the Court of Appeal for New Brunswick may have 
noted it was not tasked with arguments about Indigenous self-determination,23 
this was arguably the matter with which it was grappling, though in an attempt 
to keep such considerations of the table. Even absent arguments about 
self-determination being made by counsel, reasoning applied by the Court seems 
to presume that at contact the Mi’kmaq exercised rights to hunt locally, and that 
22. Ibid at para 63. 
23. Ibid at para 34. 










no larger political body existed that regulated hunting between local Mi’kmaq 
communities. Te only alternative way to make sense of how it proceeds would 
be to imagine the Court presumed that any larger, historical Mi’kmaq community 
is purely socio-cultural in nature, such that now it makes sense (within the 
regime of rights the Supreme Court has constructed) to require site-specifc 
rights be reserved to local instantiations of this larger cultural body. One of these 
presumptions must be made to make sense of the Court’s requirement that only
the local community that existed in this specifc area at contact can enjoy the 
relevant form of continuity with the community making the claim today. 
Tis, of course, leads to discussions concerning other sorts of questions 
that arise with respect to the proper rights-holder. Why would a Canadian 
court seem to presume there could be no matter of Mi’kmaq legal and political 
authority intruding upon how to think through this sort of dispute? Tese deeper 
discussions, however, should be put of until after we work our way through a 
more complete analysis of how precedent is likely to play out. We turn then to 
the second set of questions, focusing our attention to the characterization of the 
right being claimed; here we presume the framework for rights set out in Van der 
Peet is the only one available. In the section after this we explore how Canadian 
law might function if this presumption were lifted. 
IV. WORKING WITH POSSIBLE RIGHT-CLAIMS WITHIN THE 
VAN DER PEET FRAMEWORK 
Te Bernard case once again provides an illustrative example. As noted, as the 
case advanced past the trial level new arguments were pressed. At the Court of 
Appeal for New Brunswick Mr. Bernard—a member of, and representing, the 
larger Mi’kmaq Nation—had hoped to argue about rights of self-determination, 
in particular how a Mi’kmaq right to self-determination would entail rights 
to determine how Mi’kmaq communities, within the larger nation, hunt in 
Mi’kmaq territory. 
Te Court of Appeal for New Brunswick, however, chose to focus on the 
rulings of the trial judge, noting that while Mr. Bernard asked the court “to 
consider broader questions, such as self-determination, these questions were not 
addressed by either the trial court or the Summary Conviction Appeal Court and 
lack a proper evidentiary foundation.”24 It is illuminating, however, to consider 
how such arguments about these broader questions might have played out if they 
24. Ibid. 
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had been properly advanced and supported at the lower courts. How might they 
have fared, given existing jurisprudence? 
Mr. Bernard had hoped to explore, on appeal, the question “Does the 
Mi’kmaq right to hunt include the right to decide who can participate in the 
right to hunt?”25 Here, however, we must note two complicating factors. 
First, we have to attend to the invocation in Van der Peet that Aboriginal rights 
must be established independently, that each practice, custom and tradition must 
be shown on its own to be integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal 
community in question. At the trial level in Sparrow, the Musqueam had argued 
a right to fsh included a right to regulate fshing in their territory.26 But in Van 
der Peet, the Supreme Court undercut such moves, holding that each sort of right 
must be claimed and established on its own, there would be no piggy-backing on 
Aboriginal rights.27 Here, then, we would need the right of self-determination, 
argued to be an Aboriginal right, and the right to hunt in this area argued in the 
alternative. It would make sense to argue for these two sorts of Aboriginal rights 
in one action, as the larger-scale rights-claim—a right of the Mi’kmaq to regulate 
hunting by its membership over their entire territory—might fail. It is possible 
it might fail as a rights-claim, but it might very well be the case as well that, even 
if successful at that stage, the right to regulate might not succeed as a means of 
protecting Mr. Bernard’s exercise of his then-acknowledged Mi’kmaq right to 
hunt. Tis second sort of failure could come to be, for example, if the larger right 
to regulate hunting were found to have been extinguished, to be incompatible 
with Crown sovereignty, or to have been justifably infringed. 
Second, intimately tied to the frst point, the argument proposed would 
actually change the nature of the dispute before the court, as it only makes sense 
that once a claim is being made by the larger community to regulate hunting 
that the right to hunt—at least within Canadian law—must also be one held by 
that collective. Advancing a right to regulate on the part of the Mi’kmaq would, 
25. Ibid at para 31. 
26. Supra note 9 at para 38. At the Supreme Court of Canada, this argument was transformed 
into an argument about discretionary power in relation to the entire matter of fshing, and 
the Court pushed that sort of argument aside in the space of a sentence or two. 
27. Supra note 7 at para 70. Te Court held that 
In identifying those practices, customs and traditions that constitute the aboriginal rights 
recognized and afrmed by s. 35(1), a court must ensure that the practice, custom or tradition 
relied upon in a particular case is independently signifcant to the aboriginal community 
claiming the right. … Incidental practices, customs and traditions cannot qualify as aboriginal 
rights through a process of piggybacking on integral practices, customs and traditions. 





conceptually at least, preclude the possibility that site-specifc rights can be held 
independently by subunits of the larger collective. 
If we have two rights being claimed in the alternative, why could it not be 
that the one is held by the local community and the other by the larger Aboriginal 
collective? Leave aside for the moment the fact that in ordinary litigation we 
would not expect two diferent parties asserting two diferent sorts of rights while 
engaged in one dispute. Te situation we are contemplating can be envisioned if 
we imagine an individual (like Mr. Bernard) engaged in an activity held to be the 
exercise of an Aboriginal right. One might suppose that someone in that position 
could argue in one set of arguments in court that he was exercising a right held 
by a local community (say, to hunt in this area around this community), while 
in another set of arguments in the same action he could argue his actions were 
countenanced under the exercise of another right held by a larger community 
(say, a right to decide how individuals and subunits of the larger community 
hunt over the larger territory, that here included a decision that members of the 
local community—of which he is a member—can hunt in this area). But for this 
person to argue the activity itself is only possible due to the exercise of a Mi’kmaq 
right to regulate hunting (which, when exercised, has authorized his hunting in 
this area), the right to hunt must become dependent on the other right’s existence 
and deployment. Tese two forms of rights become inextricably tangled together. 
One might try to preserve the sense in there being two entirely independent 
rights, one held locally and the other by the larger community, by thinking things 
through using just the test from Van der Peet. Te way to do this would be to 
imagine that evidence has shown that the specifc practice in question (such as 
hunting in an area) was integral to the distinctive culture of the local body at 
contact and is still such a practice today, while evidence about the practice of 
regulating hunting by the larger body shows, as well, that it was integral to the 
culture of this larger body, and remains a practice today. But things could work 
out this way only if things just happened to work out so, in terms of the practices. 
In other words, this would only be possible if in the intervening generations 
the larger body has not altered its decisions concerning acceptable patterns 
of hunting behavior, or that it had altered how hunting practices by subunits 
would be managed but (at least some of ) the subunits had ceased respecting the 
authority of the larger body. 
We cannot presuppose, however, the sort of harmonious and fortuitously 
coordinated set of relations contained in the frst possibility, and once we imagine 
the sort of fracturing contained in the second possibility, we open the door to 
problematic situations. For instance, an individual might defend him/herself in 
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court, arguing s/he is exercising a right authorized under a decision making or 
regulatory power of a larger Aboriginal body (say, to hunt in a specifc area), where 
a local community of which this individual is not a member—a community, 
furthermore, that was historically a part of the larger community—intervenes 
in the dispute to argue this person has no right to hunt here, as only the local 
community has an Aboriginal right to engage in this specifc activity in this 
specifc location.28 Dueling rights seem to be, then, a distinct possibility. Could 
there be a proper rights-holder in such a situation? Might it be that both claims 
can be supported by sufcient evidence of the right kind in order to meet the 
Van der Peet test? How would a Canadian court deal with such a situation? Note 
once again that while we are restricting ourselves to how things function within 
the Van der Peet-enclosed world we inevitably arrive at matters that are essentially 
political and not cultural (as the subunits indirectly take on decision-making 
authority in relation to the hunting practices, as they disavow the authority of the 
larger Aboriginal body of which they have historically been a part). 
Te situation, as complex as it already appears to be, is in need of further 
unpacking. We need to think much more carefully about the odds the sort of 
right imagined held by the larger community can indeed be argued to exist in 
Canadian law, where the right claimed by the larger Indigenous community itself 
has two distinct ways of being framed: First, to regulate an activity in relation to 
its subunits and individual members; and, second, to regulate an activity (such 
as hunting) over the entirety (or bulk) of its territory. How might Canadian law 
approach claims of these kinds? 
We have already seen that precedent does not seem capable of satisfactorily 
approaching the sorts of political matters that arise when we think through the 
local/larger dimension of the problem of proper rights-holders in the context of 
taking seriously Indigenous self-determination. What of the ability of precedents 
to satisfactorily account for Indigenous self-determination when we turn to 
thinking directly of such matters, of the larger Indigenous collective making 
arguments about rights that bring in matters of regulating conduct? It is tempting 
to focus on the weaker claim that the larger community has the right to regulate 
how its subunits and members hunt in the larger territory. However, given 
common understandings of stewardship and responsibilities to lands and waters, 
it is quite likely that this power vis-à-vis members is often seen from an Indigenous 
perspective as simply an instance of the exercise of the stronger right (to regulate 
activities on traditional territory simpliciter, regardless of parties being regulated). 
28. Note, this could well have been the situation in Bernard, if a local Mi’kmaq community had 
felt it needed to protect its local hunting practices from intruders. 











We focus, then, on the stronger claim, working our way through an overview of 
the likely treatment of such claims by Canadian jurisprudence. 
Te frst challenge would be in meeting basic requirements set out in Van 
der Peet and elaborated upon in Sappier.29 Would it be possible to build a case 
that at contact it was integral to the distinctive culture of the larger Indigenous 
community that it regulated conduct on its territory? Tere are several matters 
that cast this into doubt.30 
Our one guide in this matter comes from R v Pamajewon, the only case 
that has directly engaged with a claimed right to regulate (described as a right to 
self-govern). In this case several First Nations attempted to defend the existence 
of provincially non-licensed bingo halls on their reserves by arguing they were 
exercising either an inherent right to self-govern or a right to self-regulate 
economic activities (or, a right to determine uses of reserve lands).31 In applying 
Van der Peet to these sorts of claimed rights the Court reiterated what it had 
said in that earlier case about how Aboriginal rights must be narrowly defned— 
broad assertions of rights to govern and the like will be pared down by Canadian 
courts to more manageable claims tied to specifc activities. In Pamajewon, the 
principal way of doing this was to address how the specifc activity interacts 
with government law and regulation. Te Court, bringing into the business of 
29. Supra note 7 and R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54 [Sappier]. 
30. See Van der Peet, supra note 7 at para 53. One concern is the matter of characterization or 
defnition. I do not focus on this in the text, as it is not clear the approach the Supreme 
Court laid out has to be followed for claims that do not inherently exist in tension with 
Crown regulation. Te Court in Van der Peet held that the right today is to be defned by 
thinking about three things—the nature of the practice, custom or tradition at contact, 
the nature of the activity engaged in today said to refect that practice, custom or tradition, 
and the government regulation the present activity has impugned. Leaving aside the remote 
possibility of an action seeking a declaration, litigation almost always involves attempts on 
the part of an Aboriginal community to raise the defense of the exercise of an Aboriginal 
right (where the community is represented by the individual(s) facing state sanction for 
example, a charge following hunting in an area where authorities of the state hold hunting 
is not permitted). Tere would be, then, an impugned government regulation impacting on 
how this claimed right would be defned. How, then, would the matter of characterization 
work out? In the situation we are contemplating the impugned government regulation 
would be directed toward—and seemingly in confict with—the very thing claimed to be a 
right, as the larger community and the state both assert the authority to determine how an 
activity is to be properly carried out in an area. But when we think of the activity at contact, 
we do not seem required to somehow picture this today interfacing with Crown regulation— 
the whole matter seems designed to ft with cases where in today’s world an Aboriginal 
people run afoul of Crown legislation, and yet that seems an improper way to set up a test to 
determine how claims get translated into rights. 
31. [1996] 2 SCR 821. 








CHRISTIE, POTENTIAL ABORIGINAL RIGHTS-HOLDERS 19 
defning the right the way gambling was regulated by the province, characterized 
the right as “the right to participate in, and to regulate, high stakes gambling 
activities on the reservation [sic].”32 Once characterized that way it was entirely 
unsurprising that no such right was found. For our purposes, the key takeaway 
is this reinforced requirement that the regulatory power be (somehow) framed in 
terms of specifc activities. 
On a conceptual level framing in this manner seems like an impossible task. 
It is not just that the regulatory conduct be directed toward specifc activities, 
but that the right to regulate itself be nothing more than an activity. Given that 
the right is by defnition more of a power than a right, it is hard to see how it 
could be conceived of in a way that it fts within these narrow confnes. Let us 
leave this aside and press on, imagining that somehow something like a “right to 
regulate the practice of hunting over the territory of x” could be set out in a form 
with enough specifcity such that the existence of this right was then at least a 
possibility to explore. 
Bear in mind that how the right has been narrowed to an activity quite likely 
already leaves behind Indigenous self-determination—this narrowly-focused 
“right” would seem but an inefectual shadow of the matter Indigenous 
communities would want to be pressing, namely a broad right to actively manage 
their lands and waters. We fnd ourselves now at a stage of analysis lying in between 
the matter of characterization and the business of showing the right. We frst 
need to grapple with the fact the Supreme Court held that this test is focused 
on narrowly-defned practices, customs, and traditions that evince something 
known as “Aboriginality”—that is, on activities with which the community 
engaged in a particularly “Aboriginal” manner (in Sappier for example, the act of 
harvesting and using wood had to be found to evince a particular Mi’kmaq way 
of doing so—Aboriginal rights, the Court held in Van der Peet, exist to protect 
“Aboriginality”33). How would a community go about showing it was integral to 
its Aboriginal culture that it regulated certain activities? 
We already noted that having the right be essentially an activity functions 
to move the claimed right away from Indigenous self-determination. Te only 
avenue open by way of salvage would be to try to ft the claim into this requirement 
by narrowing focus to the act of regulation itself. Perhaps this might work as well 
when we focus on this requirement of “Aboriginality.” It might seem possible 
that many Aboriginal communities would be able to argue it has always been an 
32. Ibid at para 26. 
33. See Sappier, supra note 29 at paras 42-45. 




important part of their cultural ways of living to regulate certain activities (for 
example, objectives of stewardship, common across Indigenous communities). 
Even if we skip past this problem, assuming the activity of regulating enfolds 
within it or presupposes a power, in what way must an Aboriginal community, 
then, build an argument and muster evidence? How does it show that at contact 
the power of regulating activities on its land was integral to its distinct culture and 
of a nature that it is peculiarly “Aboriginal”? Te larger Indigenous community 
would need to show not just that act(s) of regulating were integral to its distinctive 
culture, but that this all is, somehow, a culturally circumscribed matter. Te 
Mi’kmaq, for example, would have needed to show in Bernard that the acts of 
regulating hunting amongst its members and subunits was something that was 
peculiarly Mi’kmaq-ian (and, on the other side of this coin, not something that 
now refects too deeply a “European” infuence34). 
All this goes to show how challenging it would be—and what severe 
modifcations an Indigenous community would need to make—to meet the 
requirements of the Van der Peet test in relation to strong claims to regulate or 
control conduct over Indigenous lands and waters. We end this overview, however, 
with yet one more problem that arises, as this last matter brings us even more 
directly face-to-face with the interface between Indigenous self-determination 
and questions about proper rights-holders in the area of claims of site-specifc 
Aboriginal rights. Should it be possible to make sensible arguments within the 
Canadian context about rights to regulate certain activities, questions also arise 
concerning continuity. 
We began our examination into the proper rights-holder question with the 
notion that a key distinction is between local and larger-scale communities, 
but the discussion in the last few pages has shown that this can be a secondary 
matter, as when we look to the larger community other questions intrude. Te 
requirement of continuity brings these questions to the surface, as we ask about 
the nature of the larger community today, the nature of the corresponding 
community at contact, and the history that links these two. Earlier we noted that 
it seems Canadian courts are likely to presume larger communities are defned by 
shared language and customs, a delineation which limits their nature to essentially 
socio-cultural bodies. However, for these bodies to have historically regulated 
conduct on the larger traditional territory requires that they be more than 
culturally bounded—they have to be acknowledged to be socio-political bodies. 
Once we invite in the notion of socio-political bodies at contact and trace 
their continuity with bodies that exist today which might make claims about 
34. Supra note 15. 
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present-day regulatory powers, we come squarely face-to-face with the history 
of colonial law and policy. Tere are larger bodies today that are essentially 
amalgamations of Crown-generated First Nations, but there are also those 
politically-charged bodies that correspond—given generations of evolution—to 
Indigenous polities at contact.35 For the most part it is these bodies who will 
struggle to overcome the requirement of continuity within the Van der Peet test, 
since it is these bodies whose authority has been consistently—and, during the 
darkest period of colonialism in Canada, violently—attacked by both federal 
and provincial Crowns. Are they not, however, the proper rights-holders, should 
regulatory powers somehow be translated into rights? 
We could go further into our examination into how existing jurisprudence 
under the Van der Peet umbrella would likely treat claims to regulate made by 
larger Indigenous communities. Te remaining points of discussion also come 
up should we try to deal with the difcult matters we have come across so far 
by imagining the tight strictures of the Van der Peet test could be loosened in 
the context of claims to Aboriginal governance. What we have determined to 
this point is that much of what needs to be worked out, should Van der Peet
rule, is untested and that much of what would need to be addressed is such that 
existing jurisprudence ofers little concrete guidance. 
V. WORKING WITH BROADER FORMS OF SECTION 35 
RIGHTS 
One way around these problems would be to imagine that Canadian law is more 
robust than we have allowed to this point in the analysis, that it has room within 
its current boundaries for rights that do not necessarily have to meet the restrictive 
requirements set out in the Van der Peet test. We test this by keeping our eyes on 
the very sort of right at issue in the preceding discussion, a right held by the larger 
Indigenous community to regulate an activity in relation to its territory, as well 
as opportunities that might exist to fnd a right protected by section 35 but not 
limited to the confnes of Van der Peet. 
Indications that there may be other paths forward come from related areas 
of law, like the jurisprudence on Aboriginal title. In Delgamuukw the Supreme 
Court struggled with ftting what it felt they needed to say about title into the 
35. Tere are numerous examples across Canada of these bodies continuing to act as legal and 
political authorities, including that of the Mi’kmaq confederacy discussed indirectly in 
Bernard. See, for example, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, and the hereditary systems of 
the Gitxsan and the Wet’suwet’en. 









narrow confnes of Van der Peet.36 In essence, the Court skirted the matter, simply 
asserting that it seems indisputable that an Aboriginal community’s interests in 
their lands would be of central signifcance to the culture of the claimants, and 
that this satisfes the requirements of the land being integral to the distinctive 
culture of the title-holders.37 
How, then, might a right to regulate be understood and framed within the 
larger umbrella of existing case law? Tere are two dimensions to explore: First, 
we can ask about what restrictions imposed by the Van der Peet test might be 
malleable (or capable of being removed), while, second, we can ask about what 
could be added in this context. 
We saw above that Delgamuukw speaks to the ability of the common law 
to lift one major restriction, namely that claimed rights all be tightly tied to 
particular practices, customs and traditions. In shifting attention away from this 
requirement, the Supreme Court held that Aboriginal title protects more than 
just those specifc practices, customs and traditions of central signifcance to the 
distinctive culture of the title-holder. Terefore, we can well imagine that a right 
to regulate or govern protects more than specifc practices, customs and traditions 
that might have been regulated or controlled historically by this communal 
power. Just as title, while itself an Aboriginal right, is found to not have as its 
essence that it merely protects specifc practices, customs and traditions, so too 
would the right to regulate, while itself an Aboriginal right, not be found, as its 
essence, to merely act to regulate specifc practices, customs and traditions (that 
themselves could all meet the Van der Peet test). 
Tis plays out interestingly in the governance context. One could well 
imagine, for example, a narrower understanding of governance, worked so that 
36. Delgamuukw, supra note 8 at para 151. Tis is required given the architecture of the 
jurisprudence, with Aboriginal title held to be one form of an Aboriginal right, itself required 
given the fact section 35 only recognizes and acknowledges Aboriginal (and treaty) rights. See 
R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101. 
37. Delgamuukw, supra note 8 at para 151. Te Court said there: 
Although [the requirement that the right be “integral” and of central “signifcance” to the 
culture of the claimant] remains a crucial part of the test for aboriginal rights,  given the 
occupancy requirement in the test for aboriginal title, I cannot imagine a situation where this 
requirement would actually serve to limit or preclude a title claim. Te requirement exists for 
rights short of title because it is necessary to distinguish between those practices which were 
central to the culture of claimants and those which were more incidental. However, in the 
case of title, it would seem clear that any land that was occupied pre-sovereignty, and which 
the parties have maintained a substantial connection with since then, is sufciently important 
to be of central signifcance to the culture of the claimants. As a result, I do not think it is 
necessary to include explicitly this element as part of the test for aboriginal title. 
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it might ft within the strictures of the Van der Peet test, such that it really only 
speaks to patterns of regulation that existed at contact (ftting the requirement of 
rights protecting only specifc activities). A court tasked with acknowledging this 
narrow right would then be looking into particularized patterns of regulation 
at contact (such as specifc forms of regulation of “high stakes gambling,”
 or specifc forms of land use regulation). So, for example, a court would then be 
asking an Aboriginal community: how, at contact, were your determinations who 
could hunt where laid out on the landscape? Once this was set, the right today 
would have to mirror these practices, customs and traditions, acting to protect 
these patterns of activity (for example, this clan was held to have these abilities to 
do these activities in relation to these pieces of land, et cetera). 
A broader form of governance, on the other hand, would escape this 
particular constraint of Van der Peet (and so, overrule Pamajewon). Te most 
natural way to do this would be to acknowledge what seems already entirely 
sensible, that rights to governance must attach to powers.38 Much as the test from 
Delgamuukw requires that a title-claimant show such things as possession and 
sufcient occupation, a test for rights to governance would require a claimant 
to show matters that illustrate the presence of a power to determine how lands 
and waters are approached by humans (that is, governing capacities, manifest in 
patterns of group-life attuned with determinations concerning how people should 
act). We return to this matter later, as it opens the door to the key underlying 
discussion in this context, the threat that Canadian law might follow this line 
of reasoning too far, imposing normative requirements on how such governing 
capacities actually do function in the world. 
On, then, to what we might hope could be added to this form of an 
Aboriginal right, once again keeping ourselves as best possible within the limits 
of existing Canadian jurisprudence. Once again, Delgamuukw can be our guide. 
Besides the obvious thought that a robust right to governance would enhance 
the decision-making powers of the rights-holder, we might also hope such a right 
would have an inescapable economic component, and be said to arise in Canadian 
law at the assertion (or, better still, the efective exercise) of Crown sovereignty.39 
All three of these make sense as elements of a more robust Aboriginal right 
to governance, but questions naturally arise. One might wonder, for example, 
about the extent to which these separate elements could come into the content 
38. Tis would be akin to the fact that in Delgamuukw, Aboriginal title was found to be a 
property right, a right to land itself and not simply a bundle of site-specifc Aboriginal rights. 
39. Delgamuukw, supra note 8 at para 166. 















of the right.40 Would decision making extend to something like jurisdictional 
authority?41 Could such authority extend not only to the activities of the members 
of the Aboriginal community holding the right, but also to all those engaged in 
activity on the lands and waters in question? Would we expect the economic 
component to be bounded, particularly in how it played out in relation to 
non-Aboriginal interests?42 How would the presumed sovereignty of the Crown 
40. Te question of timing is somewhat distinct, as one would expect a struggle around 
whether it makes sense to ground the right at the point of contact (in any particular place), 
or on the assertion/exercise of Crown sovereignty. It might seem to make more sense to 
focus on Crown sovereignty since, as with Aboriginal title, one could argue the right arises, 
as something to be integrated with Crown sovereignty, at the point Crown sovereignty 
comes into being. But, to shift the time-frame—as much as that might make sense—would 
seemingly radically alter what has been a relatively fxed framework in place for several 
decades. Back on the other side of the ledger, however, is the fact that the Court already 
made this sort of shift in relation to Métis rights (the result being the odd fact that one people 
under section 35 show their rights came into being at the point the Crown exercised “efective 
control” in an area, while the other two peoples have to go further back, to the point of contact 
with Europeans). See Powley, supra note 21 for this shift in relation to Métis rights. 
41. See e.g. Gordon Christie, “Who Makes Decisions over Aboriginal Title Lands?” (2015) 48 
UBC L Rev 743 (exploring these questions in the context of Aboriginal title). 
42. To the extent a right to governance functioned to facilitate the growth of Aboriginal 
economies such things as “wealth-creation” could potentially fall outside its scope. One 
might reasonably expect the Supreme Court to limit governance rights to matters that enable 
the Aboriginal community to maintain a sustainable economy, one that generates something 
akin to “moderate livelihoods” for community members, following cases like R v Gladstone
[1996] 2 SCR 723 [Gladstone] and Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 
56. In Lax Kw’alaams, Justice Binnie held that: 
in the event that an Aboriginal right to trade commercially is found to exist, the court, when 
delineating such a right should have regard to what was said by Chief Justice Lamer in Gladstone
(albeit in the context of a Sparrow justifcation), as follows: 
Although by no means making a defnitive statement on this issue, I would suggest that with 
regards to the distribution of the fsheries resource after conservation goals have been met, 
objectives such as the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and the recognition of the 
historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fshery by non-aboriginal groups, are the 
type of objectives which can (at least in the right circumstances) satisfy this standard. In the 
right circumstances, such objectives are in the interest of all Canadians and, more importantly, 
the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the rest of Canadian society may well depend 
on their successful attainment. (Ibid at paras 46, quoting Gladstone, supra para 75 [frst 
emphasis added].) 
On the other side of things, an Aboriginal right to govern could also threaten to impede 
the possibilities of economic activities by others, functioning to put the brakes on exploitive 
industries. One might suspect that Canadian law might develop mechanisms within the right 
that limit its ability to be disruptive in this manner. 
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afect both the decision-making component of the right and the ability of the 
Crown of justifably limit its exercise? 
We do not need to get bogged down in details and arguments around these 
matters at this point. It is sufcient to note that at this point, precedents do not 
provide nearly enough guidance to know how these sorts of questions would play 
out in Canadian jurisprudence. Instead, the notion of going beyond the Van der 
Peet test reveals two other matters that require exploration at this juncture. 
First, arguments about sovereign incompatibility are likely to arise at 
this point, as the Crown would almost certainly argue that specifc forms of 
the Aboriginal right to governance could not survive the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty (with some forms at most now merged into Crown sovereignty), 
while, second, concerns about the racist core of Canadian jurisprudence may 
well (fnally) have to be introduced and addressed, since at some point it seems 
the jurisprudence would need to take heed of underlying arguments about the 
nature of the political organization of Indigenous collectives, arguments that are 
likely to percolate up through the analysis. 
We can leave sovereign incompatibility to one side in this discussion—while 
the doctrine is relatively settled in Canadian law, its application has not been 
discussed in any great detail by a court.43 We can say that it is relatively certain 
that particular claims to governance will be found to confict with the presence 
and exercise of Crown sovereignty, and other claims will most likely have no 
interaction with this doctrine; however, where things stand in the middle is 
unclear and unsettled. 
Te racism at the core of Canadian law is another matter. It is rarely touched 
upon by Canadian courts, though it is clear the Supreme Court is aware of the 
historical presence of a deep-seated set of racist beliefs that drove the common 
law for generations.44 Te challenge has to do with persisting forms of racism, 
43. Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33. 
44. Te Court noted as such in both Sparrow, supra note 9 and Van der Peet, supra note 7. 
In Sparrow, for example, the Court stated that “[o]ur history has shown, unfortunately all too 
well, that Canada’s Aboriginal peoples are justifed in worrying about government objectives 
that may be superfcially neutral but which constitute de facto threats to the existence of 
aboriginal rights and interests” (ibid at 1110). See also where the Court noted that: 
Te policy of negotiating treaties with the aboriginals was never formally abandoned. It was 
simply overridden, as the settlers, aided by administrations more concerned for shortterm 
solutions than the duty of the Crown toward the frst peoples of the colony settled where 
they wished and allocated to the aboriginals what they deemed appropriate.  Tis did not 
prevent the aboriginal peoples of British Columbia from persistently asserting their right to an 
honourable settlement of their ancestral rights—a settlement which most of them still await 
(Van der Peet, supra note 7 at 273). 







forms that lie hidden but often determinative within the core of section 35 
jurisprudence. We can see where they are likely to foat closer to the surface, 
potentially to the point where they become obvious to any attentive observer, 
when we think of the notion that an Indigenous collective, one that regulated 
various activities on its traditional territory at contact with Europeans, might be 
able make a claim (under this stronger form of section 35 right) to regulate these 
activities in the present. When we juxtapose such a situation with what eventuated 
in the release of Delgamuukw we can see how matters might become interesting. 
We noted earlier that Delgamuukw can lead the way to the development 
of a more robust form of an Aboriginal right to governance, as the Court there 
veered away from strict adherence to the confning test laid out in Van der Peet. 
Te problem the Court faced with claims to Aboriginal title was that even 
within the usual sorts of arguments at play within the common law, Aboriginal 
peoples had more than mere use-rights in relation to their lands. It was, quite 
simply, racist to continue to hold that the most Aboriginal peoples could claim 
within the common law were rights to use lands in certain ways, as they clearly 
met basic indicia required to be property holders (as they had been arguing for 
many generations). Te solution, recall, was to side-step Van der Peet, developing 
instead a more robust notion of Aboriginal property interests. 
A similar move to a more robust form of a right to Aboriginal governance can 
track the same sorts of sentiments. At present, the Court faces claims to Aboriginal 
governance that should amount to valid claims by Indigenous collectives to be 
considered a source of authoritative determinations concerning how activities will 
be carried out in their traditional territories. In order to parallel developments 
leading to Delgamuukw we would here have to rise above the common law (as it 
has little conceptual space for notions of such things as independent jurisdictional 
authority potentially grounding claims by peoples within the state) and focus 
instead on the state of international law. Within modern forms of international 
law Indigenous peoples enjoy rights to self-determination that speak to powers 
akin to jurisdictional authority. Unless one clings to nineteenth century racist 
notions about who can be said ft to govern, how can it not be the case that 
Indigenous traditionally-grounded collectives enjoy these rights? Without 
clinging to racist beliefs (that Indigenous peoples were not and are not sufciently 
advanced, or that their systems of governance are products of unenlightened, 
uncivilized associations of people), how can courts in Canada continue to block 
the development of robust “rights” to governance? 
All this, however, is just to point to how immensely unsettled the law is 
around rights to govern and/or regulate. When we unpack the issue of who the 
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proper rights-holder may be in certain disputes, we come up against the need 
to work out how fairly straightforward rights to engage in certain activities in 
certain places interacts with other rights that can be claimed, where these other 
rights enfold within themselves site-specifc, activity-focused rights. Whether we 
try to untangle this with Van der Peet-centered mechanisms or stretch section 35 
jurisprudence to imagine a robust form of an Aboriginal right to governance, 
we fnd that the jurisprudence leaves many serious questions unanswered. At this 
point, our only hope within Canadian law is to begin working out how the 
Supreme Court has generally approached matters under section 35. 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S PRINCIPLED 
APPROACH 
With gaps and novel problems plaguing domestic Canadian law as it might apply 
to questions concerning proper rights-holders we turn to how deeper elements of 
the law informing its structure might be used to address these matters. Behind 
rules and tests developed in the jurisprudence over the last three decades, one can 
detect sets of principles and values that drive the law as it incrementally changes 
over time. Here, we ask about what animates the Court’s approach to issues that 
arise within the general feld of Aboriginal rights. With this in hand, we can then 
reasonably expect that the Court would apply this general approach to these 
specifc unresolved matters, if and when they are brought before it. 
Time and space limitations restrict the degree of analysis with which 
we can engage. To tighten things up I propose to work with a postulation in 
hand, though one with a fair degree of exegetical support that can be found in 
the jurisprudence. Tis assumption is that the Supreme Court has developed 
jurisprudence on section 35 that fts with its general approach to all matters related 
to rights, an approach that refects Canada’s status as a liberal democracy. In the 
context of the recognition and afrmation of Aboriginal rights, this manifests as 
a project of translating all Indigenous claims into Aboriginal group rights. Tis is 
done in a manner that does not unduly stretch or break the conceptual limits on 
how peoples of liberal democracy are understood to live and prosper together in 
a multicultural setting.45 
We can track how this approach emerged onto the legal landscape in the 
narrower context of section 35. Te Court faced a clear choice in Sparrow: 
To directly address Canada’s colonial history, or to attempt to tame Indigenous 
45. I discuss this more in detail in Christie, supra note 11. 





   
  




activism through the promise of the enhancement of rights.46 Te Court chose 
the latter, signalled by its invocation of the sanctity of Crown sovereignty.47 How
it would accomplish the task it now set itself—the taming of Indigenous claims 
within the apparatus of the state—was determined by and large in Van der Peet. 
Tere the Court held that all Aboriginal claims would be treated as framing special
kinds of rights, those that protect “Aboriginality.”48 Tis, in turn, was understood 
in fundamentally cultural terms, such that Aboriginal communities could argue 
that aspects of their cultures were due recognition and protection from Crown 
interference. How Crown interference that was allowable (justifable) was 
to be assessed and managed had been set out in Sparrow, with that structure 
modifed in Gladstone.49 
Tis all fts with a more general principled approach to the matter of group 
rights in a liberal democracy. One might (somewhat crudely) say liberalism grew 
in power and reach over the last few centuries as a doctrine that elevated the 
individual, focusing attention on matters of autonomy, reason, and the will.50 
Pushing back in the Western world against systems of authority and oppression 
that had traditionally constrained the liberty and dignity of the individual, 
liberalism ofered ways of structuring the larger elements of society so that 
individuals could direct their own lives, and thereby (within the normative vision 
propounded by liberalism) have the highest likelihood of fourishing.51 
Te history of the rise of classical liberalism is also intertwined, however, 
with a historical concern with the persecution of certain groups, tied to religious 
46. Where, indeed, some sort of rights (particularly those relating to property) should have been 
protected all along, should Indigenous peoples have been treated as full citizens of Canada 
from its earliest instantiations. 
47. Sparrow, supra note 9 at 1103. 
48. Van der Peet, supra note 7 at paras 20, 44. 
49. Sparrow, supra note 9 at 1109-11; Gladstone, supra note 42. 
50. See for example, Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford University 
Press, 1989); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1958); Andrea 
T Baumeister, Liberalism and the “Politics of Diference” (Edinburgh University Press, 2000). 
51. See Jasnet Ajzenstat & Peter J Smith, eds, Canada’s Origins: Liberal, Tory, or Republican?
(Carleton University Press, 1995). Te authors developed arguments and explored the forces 
at play in struggles over Canada’s identity and future in the nineteenth and frst half of the 
twentieth century. Was liberalism in Canada attacked principally from the right (with attacks 
by conservatives) or was there also a struggle with a vision of civic republicanism coming 
from the left? See also, Jean-François Constant & Michel Ducharme, eds, Liberalism and 
Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution (University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
Here we fnd a focus on more recent Canadian history, and on the centrality of liberal 
doctrine to the development of contemporary Canadian identity and attendant institutions. 
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diferences.52 A solution crafted in the early centuries of liberalism’s emergence 
was to foreground tolerance, such that collectives tied to religious groundings 
could both enjoy a certain degree of protection from state interference and be 
relatively secure against one another.53 Te attempt was to build societal structures 
and institutions that made it possible, for example, for Roman Catholics to live 
in the same state as Protestants, both relatively secure in the knowledge the state 
would not treat one or the other preferentially and would not pursue (or allow to 
be pursued) programs of persecution. 
By the late twentieth century, much of this, within liberal doctrine, would 
spin around the notion of identity through acknowledgment of the force of 
identity in each person’s life and life-plan. Liberalism speaks to the sense that 
each person—enjoying a degree of equality with each other person in a state– 
should be able to choose his or her own way of living his or her life. Ultimately, 
who one imagines oneself to be, how one in efect becomes a self, is a matter 
of individual craft, as we each function to build who we are in a project all 
our own. Liberalism also fnds space, however, for the protection of groups to 
which individuals belong, as groups function to provide meaning for the lives of 
their members, to give individuals possible forms of identity, to do much of the 
work of ground-level identity construction that individuals can then respond to 
and work within. 
One can see, however, a tension that runs through this model of how the 
state should be structured. On the one hand, the modern liberal state has evolved 
so that forms of group living, tied to forms of group identity, are tolerated, such 
that a certain degree of group autonomy is protected. Spheres of group life, 
originally those of religious life but subsequently expanded, are expected to enjoy 
such autonomy as they need to allow those within the group to continue to see 
themselves as (at least partially) constituted as the persons they are as members of 
this group. But, on the other hand, the origins of liberalism itself lay in a reaction 
against control of the individual by various collectives or larger societal structures 
(historically the Church and entrenched aristocracies). Te limits of toleration 
52. William A Galston, Te Practice of Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
53. See Rainer Forst, “Toleration” in Edward N Zalta, ed, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(23 February 2007), online: <plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration> [perma.cc/CAP4-EXAJ]. 
Te entry on toleration provides a good overview of diferent theories of toleration, and in 
the middle and later sections looks at how some of the theories emerged from religious strife 
in Europe from the sixteenth century onward. 
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are approached when a group to which the state is expected to be tolerant is 
perceived to unduly limit the autonomy of its members.54 
In Van der Peet and Sappier,55 we see this model applied to Aboriginal rights. 
Tese rights are said to exist and function to protect distinct ways of living tied 
to matters of identity. Ways of living that are distinctly “Aboriginal,” that refect 
collective choice to believe in certain values and ideals, to live in certain ways, 
to act in certain ways, are to be “recognized and afrmed” within the larger liberal 
state within which Indigenous peoples now fnd themselves. But, as with matters 
in a liberal democracy more generally, tension arises that must be managed, 
as Aboriginal collectives are accorded a degree of protection from state activity 
but viewed suspiciously in relation to the possible role any particular collective 
may play in unduly restricting or interfering with individual autonomy and so 
the fourishing of its members. 
On the battlefeld of social philosophy original lines of struggle between 
liberals and conservatives marked disagreement between those with deep concerns 
about conserving certain collectively-defned traditional values, beliefs, and ways 
of living and those who found fundamental value in according the individual the 
freedom to question and, if so choosing, to leave such traditions behind. Within 
the liberal world the thought will be that in protecting traditional ways of living 
of Aboriginal peoples (tied to matters of identity and, in some sense, chosen) 
Aboriginal rights must be nevertheless carefully controlled by the state, as they 
refect ways of living at contact generated by liberal societies, the constant threat 
being, then, that they might function today to restrict or oppress members of 
Aboriginal collectives. 
Furthermore—and crucially important in the context of both settler– 
Indigenous (societal) relations and Crown–Indigenous (political) relations—all 
of this is presumed to occur and exist within a single socio-political setting. Tat 
is, the liberal state is presumed to be the sole source of political and legal authority, 
vested with the task of working out how socio-culturally determined “Aboriginal 
peoples” are to be worked into the state, just as the liberal democratic society of 
Canada is presumed to set the normative limits of understanding regarding how 
Aboriginal peoples can conceive of themselves living and functioning in a single, 
given social world. 
54. Both Galston and Kymlicka delve into where the limits might be in multicultural societies. 
See Galston, supra note 52 and Kymlicka, supra note 50. As well, Berlin provides one of the 
clearest articulations of the dangers of toleration. See Berlin, supra note 50. 
55. Van der Peet, supra note 7; Sappier, supra note 29. 







CHRISTIE, POTENTIAL ABORIGINAL RIGHTS-HOLDERS 31 
It is essential, then, that we bear in mind the larger vision of society within 
which the tension we are describing is embedded. Te vision is of Aboriginal 
peoples as already enfolded within the one unitary polity, that of the liberal state, 
such that whatever their interests, values, beliefs or ways of living might be, they 
are all (both the peoples and their values, beliefs, et cetera) contained as material 
to be controlled by the larger liberal societal structures of this one polity (such 
as legislatures and judicial systems). Note one vitally important implication of 
this picture—there is no room whatsoever in this model for the sense that any 
Indigenous collective could have any right to make decisions about how others
outside this collective could live (where this right might manifest either as specifc 
decisions impacting on how others act in certain situations or as societal structures 
that then go about making decisions about how others might act). 
Tis all, then, points to how we can reasonably expect the Supreme Court 
to deal with the sorts of questions that arose when we looked at existing 
precedent. We begin with the scenario in which questions around who the proper 
rights-holder might be as contained within the integral-to-the-distinctive-culture 
framework. Tis framework, we can now appreciate, was created to manage and 
limit Indigenous claims within the setting of a multicultural liberal democracy. 
Te value of culture, within such a model, is value to individuals. While 
Aboriginal cultural structures and beliefs are protected, this measure of toleration 
is always subject to oversight, as the larger vision is of sets of culturally-bounded 
First Peoples whose ways of living need to be reconciled to the rest of Canadian 
society. To the extent these ways of living can ft within the one multicultural 
society that is Canada, they can be “recognized and afrmed,” but they do not 
reach out beyond being essentially cultural matters. Tat is, there can be no sense 
allowed that Aboriginal collectives can carve out worlds of legal and political 
authority within Canada that exist alongside the larger liberal state. 
Faced with a dispute in which it might seem that both a local Aboriginal 
community is a proper rights-holder and that the larger Indigenous community 
(within which the smaller community has been historically embedded) can also 
make sensible claims to Aboriginal rights to regulate activities, we can reasonably 
expect the Supreme Court to refocus attention on the fact that Aboriginal 
rights are all culturally-grounded. Let us imagine a specifc sort of dispute (not 
patterned on Bernard, but loosely similar): An Aboriginal individual has been 
charged with hunting in a place claimed by a local Aboriginal community to 
be an area over which only they have an Aboriginal right to hunt, where this 
individual is not a member of this local community. Te individual, however, 
is a member of the larger Indigenous collective of which this local community 






has traditionally been a part, and in which the larger community itself claims an 
Aboriginal right to determine how both its individual members and its subunits 
hunt within the larger traditional territory. Tis may be part of a stronger claim 
to be able to regulate this activity simpliciter on their territories. Presumably, 
within the world of Canadian law bounded by Van der Peet, the outcome would 
depend on the evidence that could be tendered to show, in either case, whether it 
was (and continues to be) integral to the distinctive culture of the two diferent 
Aboriginal communities that they engage in the relevant activity (a “practice, 
custom, or tradition”).56 
Bearing in mind the principled approach underlying the jurisprudence, we can 
see, however, that the claim of the larger community would face particular— 
indeed, seemingly insurmountable—challenges. Whether an Aboriginal right to 
regulate is narrowly construed (as only capturing particular patterns of regulated 
activity) or more broadly defned (as a power to made determinations, whatever 
they might be), this right only exists to protect peculiarly Aboriginal activities. 
Further, digging down a bit more into the thinking behind this, the right only 
receives protection as a source of meaning for the individuals making up the larger 
group. When a Canadian court looks, then, at the larger collective it asks how the 
practice, custom, or tradition under investigation might enhance the identity of 
members of the group. When the activity in question runs up into state sanction 
a court will ask about whether state interference with the workings of the group 
(on its social institutions) impacts negatively on the ability of group members to 
continue to draw meaning as members of this group (as, for example, a Mi’kmaw, 
and not—as in Bernard—a member of the Sipekne’katik First Nation). 
Tis points to the positive weight Canadian law might accord the activity 
in question (entirely grounded in the meaning it provides individuals), and it 
is unclear how much this might amount to. Consider the kind of claim Mr. 
Bernard wished to pursue at the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick: To what 
extent could the Mi’kmaq nation show it was and is central to their being as an 
Aboriginal collective that they engage in this specifc sort of activity (an activity 
that must be identifed as peculiarly Mi’kmaq-ian)? While undoubtedly there will 
be many Aboriginal communities who would argue that it is not just important 
but essential that they (the larger Indigenous collective) managed and continue 
to manage activities on their lands and waters, this is not how Canadian law 
determines the weight it accords such activities. It looks at the matter essentially 
divorced from the signifcance an Aboriginal group might attach to an activity, 
asking instead in an objective sense how central to the way of living of the 
56. Van der Peet, supra note 7. 
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group—as a peculiarly Aboriginal way of living—the activity might have been 
and continue to be.57 Tis objective determination then purportedly measures, 
indirectly, the value to individuals making up the collective. It is this latter value 
that ultimately a Canadian court would have its eyes upon. 
On the negative side of the ledger matters become a bit clearer, but also 
much more troubling for the prospects of Indigenous self-determination. Even 
within the weaker form of the right we fnd practices, customs, or traditions that 
are instances of a collective determining how it manages the lives of individuals 
who make it up. Recall that within a multicultural liberal democracy it is these 
very matters that attract the scrutiny of state institutions. Te limits of toleration 
lie in this region, and once crossed they require state action to protect the only 
interests that actually have value within a liberal social-polity, the interests of 
individuals. Te activity of regulation at contact, note, would have taken place 
within an aliberal social environment, and so would be immediately suspect. 
To the extent the practice today continued to focus on the ability of the group 
to regulate the activity, regardless of the rights of the individuals making up the 
group, the greater the suspicion would grow. 
Meanwhile, the stronger form of the right would encompass practices, 
customs and traditions that speak to control over how all who might interact 
with their territory do so. Here we fnd a disconnect between the grounding for 
rights under the Van der Peet test and the sort of claim being imagined. Tere are 
at least two points of disconnect. First, it is difcult to see how an Indigenous 
collective could argue that it is integral to their distinctive culture that they 
determine how others interact with lands to which they have connections. 
Second, all rights to governance under this test must still be essentially cultural 
in nature, their value lying in the contribution they might make to the meaning 
and identity individuals vest in their self-driven lives. We are imagining, however, 
a practice, custom, or tradition that reaches out into the lives of those who are 
not members of this collective. Together these matters point to the difculty, 
if not impossibility, in seeing how rights grounded in this manner could include 
within them an ability to dictate how those outside the collective in question plan 
and live their lives. Beyond these problems with how the test functions, however, 
we fnd a further impediment. We noted earlier, as an implication of the model of 
rights underlying this principled approach, a seemingly insurmountable barrier, 
as the stronger form of right is not sensible within the liberal model of rights of 
cultural groups. 
57. Ibid at para 52. 





Let us move on, then, to the prospect of a more robust Aboriginal right 
to governance, one not tied to the strict requirements of the Van der Peet test. 
Here we imagine this right being essentially a power, where the claimant must 
demonstrate an ability to authoritatively determine how humans approach lands 
and waters on their territory. Unfortunately, as we noted in our introduction to 
this robust right, while precedent suggests it might be possible for Canadian law 
to fnd space, it is both unlikely to come into being and, if it were to appear, 
serious questions arise around how it would be defned and controlled by the state 
and its courts. Still, assuming it might come into being, how might we expect 
Canadian courts to answer some of the questions that would arise around it? 
Te most serious matter, of course, would have to do with the extent of 
the right and just how robust it might be. Here we focus on two dimensions: 
First, how much decision-making authority it might encompass (could it, for 
example, rise to a level commensurate with law-making, being, in essence, a right 
to jurisdictional authority?) and second, whether it could extend out over lands 
and waters and not just peoples (could it be a power in relation to a territory and 
not limited to power in relation to the members of the collective?). 
Te only way into such a right is through recognition on the part of 
Canadian courts that it is simply so within the world we all co-inhabit that 
Indigenous collectives within the larger Canadian society have the power to 
make determinations about how they live and act (about, that is, how members 
of each collective live and act). Canadian law would, in efect, have to align 
itself with international law. However, as we noted in the discussion of a Van 
der Peet-enclosed right of this kind, the focus on cultural bases for Aboriginal 
rights makes it seem impossible for such a right to extend out past the collective’s 
members to others. When we turn to the more robust right, having the right not 
limited to grounding in cultural practices, we might think it possible to imagine 
this extended reach could be part of its nature, but the deeper approach taken 
by the Supreme Court—having Aboriginal rights ft with liberal sensibilities in a 
liberal democracy—pushes back against this possibility. 
Tere are two sides to this: on the one hand, the principled approach blocks 
certain matters, as it is based on reasons and arguments that speak to what is 
unacceptable, or even not sensible, within the liberal world of normativity and 
governance. On the other hand, it also advances certain matters, setting out how 
certain issues should be, and will be, both understood and dealt with. 
On the frst front, Canadian courts cannot countenance the emergence of 
Aboriginal rights that bring into the landscape robust Indigenous socio-political 
bodies. Canadian social institutions are built on liberal architectural principles 
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and ideals, built so that as much as possible free and equal individuals can 
determine how to live their lives,58 and can then freely and equally pursue 
lives thereby imagined. Indigenous socio-political bodies do not just introduce 
potential challenges to this unitary system, but also make possible other forms of 
social structure, built on other visions of what society is and can be. 
What is possible, then, are forms of Indigenous legal and political authority 
that can be carefully circumscribed within the liberal state. What is possible is a 
world in which liberal institutions of the state make all determinations about what 
activities on Indigenous territories will be forbidden, countenanced or promoted, 
where Indigenous legal and political authorities are able to have an advisory voice 
in matters of deliberations. Tis is the model of Indigenous self-determination 
being constructed all around us in the modern Canadian context. 
VII.CONCLUSION 
Where, then, do we fnd ourselves at this point in our analysis and discussion? 
We saw that there are numerous serious matters Canadian courts have not 
spoken to, which required that we consider how the underlying nature of existing 
jurisprudence might eventuate in resolutions to the questions we developed. 
We now see, however, that the jurisprudence is built on a set of principles and 
values that are meant to continue to push how Canada relates to Indigenous 
peoples away from any substantive engagement with matters of Indigenous 
self-determination. Should Indigenous communities accept and learn to live 
with the strong likelihood that Canadian law will at most allow for domesticated
rights to say such things as “these members can engage in this activity in this 
place,” where constant state oversight and control further tame the powers of 
these communities? 
Trough the stages of analysis, we kept an eye on a deeper struggle that 
questions about proper rights-holders touch upon—the fact of competing legal 
and political authorities. Tose bodies with roots in traditional systems exercise 
parallel and independent authority over not just community members but the 
community’s lands and waters. Limiting struggles between these bodies and local 
Aboriginal communities (state-generated band councils) to essentially cultural 
matters strips away these deeper layers of understanding, and seems designed to 
further entrench in the minds and actions of Indigenous peoples the sense that 
they can only hope for certain kinds of understandings of both problems and 
58. Tese are determinations made in a subjective manner, with input from the nature of lives 
they fnd themselves living as members of groups. 
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solutions, those emanating from centuries of development of liberal democratic 
thought in the West. 
We have touched upon the deepest level at which the clash between Indigenous 
communities and state is located, as the ground level of this layered clash brought 
to the surface is not just between potentially competing authorities but is rather 
between diferently grounded political bodies. Te clash is between theories of 
how society can and should be structured. Pushing back on how Canadian courts 
hope to tame Indigenous aspirations is vital, not just for the recognition of the 
true rights-holders, but to signal the continuing life of alternate understandings 
of how humans can live in the world. 
